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International environmental regimes are considered key factors in dealing with global environmental
change problems. It is important to understand if and how regimes are effective in tackling these prob-
lems, which requires knowledge on their potential impact on these problems as well as on their political
feasibility. Integrated assessments of global environmental change, which are mainly bio-physical and
technology-economic oriented, barely address knowledge on environmental regimes, due to problems in
drawing general and policy relevant lessons on regime effectiveness and inherent difﬁculties in modelling
human and social dimensions. This paper presents an innovative approach to formalize knowledge on the
effectiveness of environmental regimes, so that scientists from both the political science and integrated
assessment domain can understand it, discuss it and contribute to it. We constructed a conceptual
framework for the systematic analysis of conditions that inﬂuence regime effectiveness and implemented
it in a computer model using fuzzy logic methodology. We evaluated the fuzzy model in an ex post case
study on four existing international environmental regimes. The model can be used as an aid in analysing
the effectiveness of existing or future regimes, highlighting which determinants contribute to success or
failure, and it enables systematic and meaningful comparisons between regimes and policy measures.
We discovered that formalizing knowledge on environmental regimes in a framework and model
enhanced its transparency and deductive power as it forced us to be explicit about our choices and
assumptions. Developing and using the framework and model also revealed the lacunae in knowledge in
environmental regime theory which may inform regime researchers to further structure and increase
their knowledge. By making knowledge on environmental regimes explicit and understandable we have
taken an important step towards a better integration of political science in integrated assessments. We
believe, however, that this integration is still in its early days and requires further attention in the future.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Global environmental problems have features that distinguish
them from traditional scientiﬁc problems. They concern ‘global
public goods’, are global in their scale and long-term in their impact
and they are characterized by high uncertainty, complexity andal Change Modelling.
mental Assessment Agency,
The Netherlands. Tel.: þ31 (0)
gmail.com (M.G. de Vos).
-NC-ND license.multiple interests, requiring transdisciplinary approaches to deal
with them (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Jakeman et al., 2006;
Schmolke et al., 2010; van der Sluijs, 2002). In order to address
global environmental problems most effectively and efﬁciently,
policy makers have developed series of systems of rights and
obligations and related decision-making procedures in interna-
tional environmental policy, also known as international environ-
mental regimes (Carter, 2007). International environmental
regimes are a type of institution, where an institution is understood
as a “cluster of rights, rules, and decision-making procedures that
gives rise to a social practice, assigns roles to participants in the
practice, and guides interactions among occupants of these roles”
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Fig. 1. Description of the various steps in the process of developing a conceptual
framework and a fuzzy model to analyse regime effectiveness.
M.G. de Vos et al. / Environmental Modelling & Software 44 (2013) 101e112102(Young, 2008: xxii). International environmental regimes are
a distinct type of institution dealing with issue-speciﬁc environ-
mental concerns at the international level (Hasenclever et al., 1997).
International environmental regimes are considered key factors in
dealing with global environmental problems (Biermann, 2007;
Kates et al., 2001), but their development and implementation may
be costly and difﬁcult. It is therefore important to understand if and
how regimes are effective in tackling these problems. This requires
knowledge on the potential impact of environmental regimes as
well as on their political feasibility.
The creation and performance of regimes to solve international
environmental problems is studied by the ﬁeld of international
relations and more speciﬁcally by environmental regime theory.
Scholars in this ﬁeld have applied different qualitative and quanti-
tative approaches to deﬁning and measuring regime effectiveness
(Haas et al., 1993; Miles et al., 2002; Young, 1999, 2001). When
measuring the performance of international regimes, scholars by
and large focus on the behavioural change of key actors (i.e. states)
and not on environmental improvements (Easton, 1965; Underdal,
2002). Even though some scholars recognize the need to look at
environmental improvement, measurement of the speciﬁc impacts
of a regime is difﬁcult because disentangling these impacts from
inﬂuences that are independent from the regime is complicated and
often practically almost infeasible. An additional complication is
that a regime can only inﬂuence behaviour, achieve its goals, and
address an environmental problem once it has been formed and
implemented (Underdal, 2002), and thus assessing the effectiveness
of proposed regimes is inevitably speculative. When trying to draw
reliable and policy-relevant lessons on awide variety of existing and
proposed regimes the current approaches to deﬁning and
measuring regime effectiveness suffer from problems of compara-
bility and generalizability (Biermann et al., 2007). A further chal-
lenge is that these types of analyses are often not combined with
environmental outcomes. One way to improve this is through
a better cooperation between the ﬁelds of environmental regime
theory and integrated assessment of global environmental change.
Integrated assessment is a methodology to analyse global
environmental problems by combining knowledge from the social,
environmental and economic domains relying strongly on quanti-
ﬁcation and computer simulation, but also by incorporating
participatory methods to include stakeholders in integrated
assessments (Siebenhüner, 2002). Integrated assessment models
have become essential tools in supporting environmental decision
making by exploring the consequences of alternative policies or
scenarios (Jakeman et al., 2006; Schmolke et al., 2010; van der
Sluijs, 2002). Scientists in the ﬁeld of integrated assessment
acknowledge that it is important to include knowledge on envi-
ronmental regimes in their analyses (Reid et al., 2010; Rotmans and
deVries, 1997; Turner et al., 2003), but they have not yet been
successful in doing so (Ostrom, 2009) due to inherent difﬁculties to
model human and social dimensions. Models of social institutions
ultimately rest on assumptions about human behaviour, which is
‘substantially nontrivial’ (Braumoeller and Satori, 2004) and might
be more complex than a model suggests or is able to capture.
Another core problem is the difﬁculty in conceptualizing key social
concepts e like power and legitimacy e that are essential in
explaining regime effectiveness, but are difﬁcult to operationalize
in a form that can be used for quantitative modelling approaches.
Therefore, knowledge on environmental regimes is often dis-
regarded in integrated assessments of sustainable development
(Biermann, 2007).
In this paper the multi-disciplinary challenge of bringing
together the worlds of integrated assessment and environmental
regime theory is taken up. We here offer an innovative approach to
formalize knowledge on the effectiveness of environmentalregimes. The aim of this paper is to make this knowledge explicit so
that scientists from both domains can understand it, discuss it and
perform systematic analysis of the effectiveness of environmental
regimes. We constructed a conceptual framework for the system-
atic analysis of conditions that inﬂuence regime effectiveness based
on regime theory. We implemented the framework in a computer
model using fuzzy logic methodology (Zadeh, 1965), a simple and
straightforward way of linguistic reasoning. We expect added value
of this framework and the computer model as a tool to perform
assessments of international environmental regimes and of options
to improve their effectiveness.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
construction of the conceptual framework, the selection of a suit-
able modelling method and its translation into a fuzzy logic model.
Section 3 evaluates the model in an analysis of four existing envi-
ronmental regimes and Section 4 discusses main ﬁndings on the
usefulness and prospects of our conceptual framework and model.
Throughout the paper wewill reﬂect on methodological challenges
we encountered in our research.
2. Methodology
The following section explains our method of formalizing knowledge on envi-
ronmental regimes (Fig. 1). We formulated a deﬁnition of regime effectiveness,
gathered knowledge on regime effectiveness in a literature review and formalized
this knowledge in rules and a conceptual framework. In a review of possible
modelling approaches we selected fuzzy logic as the most appropriate technique.
The last part of this section describes the translation of the conceptual framework
into a fuzzy model.
2.1. Assessing regime effectiveness: building on international regime literature
In the development of international environmental regimes, regime formation
and regime implementation can be considered as two important distinct phases.
While the former includes the negotiations among states, the latter includes the
process of putting the regime’s stipulations into practice. Although successful
regime formation and implementation may not be sufﬁcient to guarantee effective
ways to deal with the environmental problems at hand, we consider them as
necessary preconditions for the functioning of international environmental regimes.
In this paper we therefore use the terms ‘likelihood of regime formation’ and the
‘likelihood of regime implementation’ as proxies for their effectiveness.
Within the research ﬁeld of international regimes, the literature provides
numerous hypotheses regarding the factors that inﬂuence regime formation and
implementation (for instance: Breitmeier et al., 2006; Miles et al., 2002; Mitchell,
2008; Underdal, 2002; Young, 2008). In a review of this literature (Dellas et al.,
2011) we identiﬁed robust general ﬁndings and translated them by expert judge-
ment into a set of 64 clear rules on the likelihood of regime formation and imple-
mentation (see Appendix for an overview), with a view towards formalizing this
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formal modelling.
2.2. Constructing a conceptual framework
From the rules we identiﬁed the determinants of likelihood of regime formation
and implementation (Table 1a and b). The next step was to relate the determinants,
i.e. ‘input variables’, and the two phases in regime development together in
a conceptual framework, using the likelihood of regime formation and of regime
implementation as respective ‘output variables’ (Fig. 2).
We have distinguished the input variables in ‘context’ and ‘design’ variables
(Table 1a and b). There are three categories of ‘context’ variables: ‘problem struc-
ture’, which refers to attributes of the environmental problem (Hovi et al., 2003;
Miles et al., 2002; Young, 1999), ‘(state) actors’, which refers to the (state)actors who
take part in negotiations on the regime and its implementation (Hasenclever et al.,
1997), and ‘regime environment’ which concerns the background against which
regime formation or implementation takes place including the inﬂuence of other
institutions and norms (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006). The ‘design’ variables refer to
the choices that policy makers can make during regime formation or implementa-
tion, and they in fact can mitigate or enhance the impact that the ‘context’ variables
have on regime effectiveness. As the ‘context’ variables vary between different
environmental problems, the appropriate institutional structure or regime ‘design’
will also differ (Young, 2008). For example the context variable ‘asymmetry of states’
interests’ describes the difference between states with respect to the responsibility
for causing an environmental problem, the capacity to address it, and the vulnera-
bility to its impacts (Underdal, 2001). High asymmetry may negatively affect the
likelihood of regime formation or implementation (rules C3 and C4, see Appendix).
Designing policy measures such that ‘differentiated responsibilities’ are allowed for
the different (state)actors, can help to mitigate the negative impacts of the asym-
metry in their interests, thus enhancing likelihood of regime formation orTable 1
A. Input variables of regime formation listed per category. B. Input variables of regime im
A.
Context variables
Problem structure Actors
 Regulation costsn  Asymmetry of interest of
powerful statesn
 Public concernn  Asymmetry of interest of
important states in issue arean
 Systemic/cumulative problemb Support of powerful statesn
 Uncertaintyb  Support of important states
in issue arean
 Collaboration/coordination problemb  Number of economic sectorsn
 Homogeneous statesb
 Urgencyb
 Cumulative cleavagesb
 Powerful pushersb
 Powerful laggardsb
B.
Context variables
Problem structure Actors
 Regulation costsn  Participation governmentb
 Collaboration/coordination
problemb
 Participation powerful statesn
 Systemic/cumulative problemb  Participation important states
in issue arean,m
 Number economic sectorsn
 Outvoting of important statesb
 Asymmetry of interest of
powerful statesn
 Asymmetry of interest of
important states in issue arean
n: Numerical variable: expressed on a scale from 0 (low) to 10 (high), translated into lin
b: Binary variable: expressed as 0 (no) or 10 (yes), translated into linguistic categories u
m: Mitigating variable: a (design) variable which appears in a combined rule and mitigaimplementation (Young, 2008). Some ‘design’ variables refer to choices that policy
makers can make, especially in the implementation phase, which do not have
a mitigating effect on context variables but can act independently. For example
having ‘precise rules’ or a ‘strong secretariat’will always have a positive effect on the
likelihood of regime implementation, independent of the given context.
The above conceptual framework serves as a simple representation of deter-
minants of regime performance and the categorization of the identiﬁed context
variables into ‘problem structure’, ‘regime environment’ and ‘(state) actors’ provides
some structure and overview. Although the rules that underlie the framework ﬁnd
their basis in regime theory, the applied categories are not commonly recognized as
separate entities for which e.g. associated aggregate indicators can be envisioned
which express their importance for regime performance. Besides, also the aspect of
time is not explicitly addressed in this framework, since we could not ﬁnd clear and
robust information in the literature on the temporal dynamics involved, although it
is obvious that regime formation and implementation are processes in time. A
similar remark holds for interactions between the input variables (determinants): as
we did not ﬁnd clear information in literature on the inﬂuence of interactions, we so
far treated all input variables as independent entities.
The literature review leading to the collection of knowledge rules did not
provide equal amounts of information for the different categories of input variables
on their inﬂuence on the likelihood of regime formation and implementation. As
a consequence the four categories of input variables do not have an equal number of
variables in the model and not an equal number of rules in the fuzzy rule base.
Categories with many variables therefore contribute relatively more often to the
overall score of likelihood of regime formation and implementation than categories
with few variables. Since the literature does not provide clear information on the
relative importance of one category of input variables over the other, we decided not
to put additional weighting to these categories in the model. Additionally, not all
relevant literature on cooperation between actors (such as economic or psycho-
logical theory) were reviewed, so that the concepts included here are derived fromplementation listed per category.
Design variables
Regime environment Negotiation process
 Preceding
agreementb
 Negotiation costsn
 Scientiﬁc
advisory bodiesb
 Differentiated rulesb,m
 Side paymentsb,m
 Transaction costsn,m
 Framework treatyb,m
 Informal agreementb,m
 Incentivesb,m
 Positive issue linkagesb,m
Design variables
Regime environment Regime design
 Institutional
frameworkb
 Knowledge mechanismb
 Negative interplayb  Differentiated rulesb,m
 Positive interactionsb Compliance mechanismb,m
 Side paymentsb,m
Information mechanismb,m
 Precise rulesn
 Legally binding rulesb
 Strong secretariatb
 Reporting mechanismb
 Consensus votingb
 Broad issue coverageb
 Public awareness
mechanismb
guistic categories using the membership function from the middle panel of Fig. 3.
sing the membership function from the upper panel of Fig. 3.
tes the negative impact of the other input (context) variable on the output.
Problem structure
Regime
formation
Regime
implementation
Negotiation process
Rules
Likelihood of
regime formation
Rules
Rule base
Rule base
Rules
Regime
environment
Actors
Problem
structure
Regime design
Rules
Likelihood
of regime
implementation
Rules seluRseluR
Regime
environment
Actors
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework for the analysis of the likelihood of regime formation and implementation.
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guaranteeing a minimum coherence in terms of underlying ontological and epis-
temological assumptions. We, however, acknowledge that our theoretical bias
towards neo-liberal institutionalism (regime theory) excludes other plausible
accounts of the likelihood and effectiveness of international cooperation. Lastly, the
rules included are by no means meant to be conclusive, but rather a preliminary list
that could be added to or reﬁned.
2.3. Review of modelling approaches
Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004), and Young et al. (2006) indicate a broad
range of methods and approaches that can be helpful in studying international
regimes, institutions and governance issues. In our speciﬁc search for modelling
methods enabling to code the current body of knowledge on regime effectiveness
that we retrieved from environmental regime theory, we have considered a number
of well-known formalized modelling methods, including system dynamic model-
ling, game theoretic modelling, agent-based modelling, qualitative reasoning
models and qualitative simulation models. In judging which method to choose, we
primarily focused on the question whether it could offer good possibility to deal
directly with the extracted regime theoretic knowledge, taking also implicitly into
account its potential to 1) allow systematic analysis and comparison of environ-
mental regimes, 2) deal with often ambiguous social science concepts, 3) deal with
quantitative and qualitative knowledge from different sources as well as with
missing knowledge and uncertainty and 4) allow for incorporation of the behaviour
and interactions of actors and institutions,
System dynamic modelling describes and simulates the feedback processes in
complex dynamic systems (Sterman, 2000). Stylized system dynamical models have
beenused to study institutional aspects inmaneenvironment interactions (Anderies,
2000; Good and Reuveny, 2006) while at a larger scale the system dynamic model
International Futures (Hughes, 2001) covers aspects of socio-political structures and
processes. Depending on complexity and required detail e system dynamic models
often require a large amount of quantitative data for development and testing,
especially if one wants to include information on the heterogeneity of actors and on
the diversity of their relationships and behaviours inmodelling social systems. Aside
from these restrictions, we judged the system dynamics approach as inappropriate
for our currentmodelling purpose since the very rationale for applying this approach
was missing in our case: the knowledge rules on regime effectiveness that weextracted from environmental regime theory did not explicitly cover any dynamic
feature in regime formation and implementation.
Modelling methods like game theory and agent-based modelling focus espe-
cially on the behaviour of actors and their mutual relationships. These methods
have been used to study how institutions constrain the choices available to actors
or inﬂuence the interaction with their environment (Gotts et al., 2003; Janssen and
Ostrom, 2006) and how bargaining and cooperation can lead to coalition formation
in international environmental treaties (Finus, 2008; Kilgour and Wolinsky-
Nahmias, 2004). Although these methods have at places been criticized for the
sometimes rather restrictive and unrealistic description of the behaviour of actors
(Green and Shapiro, 1996), the difﬁculties to understand the logic of their results
(Axelrod, 1997; Earnest and Rosenau, 2006) and their limited ability to describe
hierarchical systems based on authority (Bousquet et al., 2001; Earnest and
Rosenau, 2006), these objections can to a certain extent be resolved. The main
reason for us not to use game theory or agent-based modelling in this stage was
that the body of rules that we extracted from environmental regime theory was
reﬂecting the behaviour of actors and their interests and drive to cooperate only in
a very general way. It presently didn’t yet provide sufﬁcient detailed information to
enable a sensible use of game theory or agent-based modelling.
Qualitative reasoning and qualitative simulation (Forbus, 2004; Kuipers, 1994)
provide means and tools for formally representing and reasoning with incomplete,
uncertain knowledge that is difﬁcult to quantify. Qualitative simulation uses
‘common-sense’ system-dynamical insight and expertise in combination with
consistent reasoning, as a suitable tool for this purpose. It has e.g. been applied in
research on the ‘syndromes of global change’, where the complex processes of social
and environmental changes are described as syndromes encompassing various
better or lesser understood variables (Biermann et al., 1999; Petschel-Held et al.,
1999). Main reason for not considering qualitative simulation as our present
choice for modelling was similar as for system dynamic modelling: the knowledge
rules that we took as a basis for studying regime effectiveness did not explicitly
cover dynamical aspects.
A different branch of qualitative reasoning methods, which focuses less on the
dynamical characteristics of the system e and is therefore more suitable for our
purposee is formed bymethods linked to Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) and fuzzy
logic (FL). These methods also focus on a more global characterization of the system,
in terms of relationships between parts/components/subsystems, combining quan-
titative as well as qualitative knowledge on these characteristics and using some
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E.g. Qualitative Bayesian Belief Networks have been used to study the role and effects
of institutional settings in complexwatermanagement issues (Saravanan, 2008), and
enable also linkage with system dynamic modelling (van Kouwen et al., 2008).
Given that our conceptual framework is based on rather qualitative rules
expressing to what extent certain determinants inﬂuence the likelihood of regime
formation and implementation, the use of such a qualitative probabilistic modelling
set upmight seem rather appropriate to put our conceptual framework into amodel.
This would however require that experts on environmental regimes have a certain
familiarity in expressing their knowledge on environmental regimes adequately e
albeit qualitatively e in terms of chances/probabilities reﬂecting certain levels of
likelihood, which was considered as a somewhat restrictive condition.
Though our conceptual framework e in speaking of likelihood of regime
formation and implementation e certainly contains some probabilistic elements, its
focus is actually more on the logical e and rather qualitative e rule-base. Therefore
we consider the fuzzy logic approach as an adequate candidate to formalize this
framework into a model, especially since the set of rules serves as direct input basis
to this form of modelling. In the next sections it is elaborated how we have oper-
ationalized this.
2.4. Our approach: fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic reasoning (Zadeh, 1965), in fact meets all the abovementioned
criteria. A basic property of fuzzy logic is that it uses non-numeric linguistic vari-
ables to express vague or imprecise knowledge which cannot be stated in exact
numerical form, e.g. ‘public concern is high’, and enables further processing of this
information on the basis of fuzzy rules which link these vague/fuzzy propositions,
thus performing computation with words rather than with numbers. It therefore
provides a systematic and transparent way of dealing with the propositions e ob-
tained from environmental regime theory e on regime effectiveness and its deter-
minants, for which a straightforward quantiﬁcation was impossible. Furthermore,
fuzzy logic provides formalization methods to combine and integrate quantitative
and qualitative knowledge from different domains and sources and yield concrete
answers which could eventually be related to quantitative approaches in integrated
assessment analyses. Fuzzy logic methods have been used to combine social and
ecological knowledge in sustainability assessments (Acosta-Michlik et al., 2008;
Phillis and Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001).
In the following sections we explain the various steps that we took in developing
a model to assess regime effectiveness in a ‘fuzzy logic’ manner (Fig. 1). For the
implementation of ourmodel we have used the freely available fuzzy logic toolbox of
Babuska (1993), which runs under Matlab.
2.5. Constructing a fuzzy model
The next step was to translate the conceptual framework into a formal model
that would enable a systematic analysis and evaluation of the factors determiningMembership grade
50
0
1
Membership grade
Likelihood of regim
50
0
1
Membership grade
50
0
1
Fig. 3. Membership functions for the binary input variables (upper panel), numerical inputregime effectiveness, and facilitate future integration of this knowledge in inte-
grated assessment analyses.
2.5.1. Quantiﬁcation and fuzziﬁcation of variables
If variables in the conceptual framework can be quantiﬁed in one form or
another, the ﬁrst step in our modelling approach is to translate this quantitative
information into linguistic categories (like e.g. ‘public concern is high’, or ‘public
concern ismedium’) which form the core elements in the fuzzy logic approach. This
process is called fuzziﬁcation. Not only for explicitly available quantitative variables
this is done, but also for variables on which no quantitative information (e.g. in
terms of ‘measurable’ indicators) is available: the latter variables are ﬁrst given
numerical values based on expert-judgement, e.g. on a scale running from 0 to 10 as
a means to express their magnitude, before establishing the fuzziﬁcation. In the end,
also the explicitly available quantitative variables are transformed to that same scale
to provide e for ease of use and reference e a common basis for the subsequent
translation into linguistic categories.
For this translation into linguistic categories we have employed three categories
to characterize real-valued input variables, viz. ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. Each of
these categories is represented by a membership function (Fig. 3), which assigns to
each value  of the input variable a membership grade between 0 and 1 which
expresses towhat extent this speciﬁc value belongs to the speciﬁc linguistic category
(i.e. to what extent the value can be considered as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’). For
example, if the variable ‘asymmetry’ has (transformed) numerical value 6, it will be
categorized as mainly ‘medium’ (membership grade 0.8) and a little bit as ‘high’
(membership grade 0.2), while not as ‘low’ (membership grade 0). For output vari-
ables we employ 5 linguistic categories, viz. ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’ and
‘very high’, to obtain more differentiation in our statements on the likelihood of
regime formation or implementation. This completes the fuzziﬁcation processes for
numeric values. For variables that initially have binary values instead of numerical
ones, the fuzziﬁcation process is straightforward: they are assigned to two linguistic
categories ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (or equivalently, present/absent, true/false), and subse-
quently are given membership grades 1 or 0 for the complementary (non-over-
lapping) membership functions characterizing category ‘high’ or ‘low’ (Fig. 3, upper
panel). In fact binary variables are treated as crisp (and not as fuzzy).
2.5.2. Fuzzy rule base construction
The heart of the fuzzy logic method is the fuzzy rule base (available as
Supplementary information), a set of reasoning rules that reﬂects the knowledge on
the system of interest, which in our case is based on the robust ﬁndings from
international environmental regime literature as represented by the conceptual
framework and its associated knowledge rules. Below we present a number of
typical examples which illustrate how we have created the fuzzy rule base for our
model from the knowledge rules associated to the conceptual framework. The fuzzy
rules are described in terms of IFeTHEN statements, and relate input variables with
the output variable.
1. (a) Some knowledge rules in the framework describe the effect of a single
variable on the output variable ‘regime formation’ or ‘regime implementation’, forLow
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Very low
Medium
High
Very high
Input variable
10
e formation / implementation
10
Input variable
10
variables (middle panel) and output variables (lower panel) used in the fuzzy model.
Collect expert scores for inout variables
Collection of model input
Model calcullation
Convert expert scores to single 
set input values
Derive linguistic values for input variables
Evaluate fuzzy rules
(fuzzy inference)
Defuzification of aggregated value
Derive linguistic values for output variables
(Degree Of Fulfillment)
Fig. 4. Description of the different steps in the process of applying the model to
analyse four existing regimes.
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decreases likelihood of regime formation”. Translation of this rule into a fuzzy rule
could e.g. yield IF asymmetry is high THEN likelihood of regime formation is very low.
(b) Some rules in the framework describe the combined effect of a two input
variables, for instance rule B2 (Appendix) “If a problem is marked with great
asymmetry of powerful states’ interests, differentiation of rules increases likelihood
of regime formation”.
These combined rules are in fact further speciﬁcations of single rules to illustrate
the mitigating effect of design variables (‘differentiation of rules’) on the negative
impact of context variables (‘asymmetry of powerful states’). In ‘translating’ this rule
B2 to the fuzzy rule base the effect of single context variables on the output variable
was valued as ‘low’ and not as ‘very low’ to account for themitigating effect of design
variables. Rules from the framework that contained the same input variable were
combined in the fuzzy rule base to prevent unnecessary rule conﬂict. Translation of
rules B2 and C3 would therefore yield the following set of fuzzy rules
1. IF asymmetry is high AND differentiation is true THEN likelihood of regime
formation is low
2. IF asymmetry is high AND differentiation is false THEN likelihood of regime
formation is very low
Design variables in the regime formation phase almost all act as mitigating
variables (Table 1a) which give them less importance than context variables, since
they only contribute when context variables have a negative impact but not when
context conditions are neutral or favourable. In the regime implementation phase,
on the other hand, many design variables act independently upon regime perfor-
mance variables (Table 1b), rendering them a bigger contribution to likelihood of
regime implementation.
(c) Since literature on regime theory did not provide information on regime
effectiveness in all possible situations, the rules in the conceptual framework do
not cover all possible linguistic values of the input variables. E.g. in situations
where asymmetry is low or medium, there are no rules available, and thus it is not
clear whether these speciﬁc conditions affect the likelihood of regime formation or
not. A possible approach would be to only include rules in the rule base for situ-
ations on which we have information, but this would lead to many situations were
no inferences can be made. As a consequence the model results would then be
based on only few variables which are assigned disproportionate importance.
Although one can argue that this is a rightful consequence of our limited knowl-
edge on the effects of some determining factors. we have chosen e since we
wanted all variables to be included in every model analysis - for an alternative
approach where we have artiﬁcially extended the fuzzy rule base by adding rules
e.g. assuming a neutral likelihood of regime formation in situations on which no
information was available:
3. IF asymmetry is medium THEN likelihood of regime formation is medium
4. IF asymmetry is low THEN likelihood of regime formation is medium
About one third of the rule-base currently consists of rules assuming a neutral
likelihood. A sensitivity study (available as Supplementary information) shows that
results of the limited rule-base and the artiﬁcially extended rule-base are compa-
rable. However, we consider the rule-base as an ongoing body of work and hope
regime theorists feel encouraged to perform additional study and improve the rule-
base by replacing artiﬁcially added rules by genuine knowledge rules.
2.5.3. Fuzzy inference
With the fuzzy rule base thus constructed we could, for a given set of input
variables, evaluate the likelihood of regime formation and implementation. This
activity is called fuzzy inference andwe applied the commonly usedMamdani’s min-
max inference algorithm (Jang, 1997) which works with a simple ‘min-max’ operation
structure: Each fuzzy IFeTHEN-rule is activated by ﬁrst determining the degree of
fulﬁlment of the rule’s antecedent, which is equal to the membership-grade of the
condition in the IF-part. The inferred implication of the rule’s antecedent is estab-
lished subsequently by redeﬁning themembership-function of the rule’s conclusion,
i.e. the THEN-part. This redeﬁnition is performed by applying the min-operator,
which clips the membership values of the rule’s conclusion by the value of the
antecedent’s degree of fulﬁlment.
Next, in an aggregation process, all activated IFeTHEN rules are combined by
applying the max-operator on all the clipped membership functions of the activated
rule’s conclusions. This results in an encompassing membership function which
assigns a weighting to each output value (i.e. likelihood of regime formation or
implementation); see Jang (1997) for further details on this inference process.
2.5.4. Defuzziﬁcation: calculation of regime effectiveness
The fuzzy inference of the previous step has resulted in an overall fuzzy
conclusion on the likelihood of regime formation or implementation, represented in
terms of an encompassing membership function obtained in the aggregation
process. The ﬁnal step in our fuzzy logic framework involves the back-translation of
this fuzzy information into a crisp value for the likelihood of regime formation orimplementation. For this defuzziﬁcationwe use the ‘centre of gravity’ method, which
determines the speciﬁc output value (centroid) which divides the area under the
membership function into two equally sized subareas {see \Jang, 1997 #155}.
This ﬁnal output value gives an numerical indication of the likelihood that
a regime will be formed or implemented in a given situation. A low likelihood does
not necessarily mean that regime formation or implementation do not take place,
but rather indicates that formation or implementation is very difﬁcult in the given
circumstances. In addition to this single overall output value, we have also calculated
‘partial results’ by considering the speciﬁc contribution of the subset of rules which
are linked to each of the three categories of context variables (State Actors, Regime
Environment, Problem Structure). In this way we gain some additional insight in the
contribution of each separate category to the ﬁnal output. An illustration of this is
given in next section where we discuss the application of our model.
The interpretation of the ﬁnal quantitative output of the model may be difﬁcult,
as there is neither a universally accepted deﬁnition nor metric of the likelihood of
regime formation and implementation that could be applied in the model. However,
the quantitative model results enable systematic and meaningful comparisons
between regimes.
3. Evaluation of the model
We evaluated the model by analysing three existing regimes, i.e
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (plus
the Montreal Protocol), the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (plus the Kyoto Protocol), the Convention on Biological
Diversity and one regime that was never established in the form of
a signed treaty, the International Forest Regime.
The focus of our model analysis was on the circumstances under
which the regimes have been developed and whether the forma-
tion and implementation process could be considered easy or
difﬁcult for the participating states. As the formation and imple-
mentation of these regimes have been studied by different scholars
over the past years (e.g. Dimitrov, 2003; Barrett, 1999), the model
results could also be compared with observations in reality. These
observations, the input data used in the model analysis and the
knowledge captured in the fuzzy rule base do, however, not origi-
nate from fully independent sources of information. This analysis
should therefore not be seen as a validation of the model results,
but rather as an exercise to assess whether the model is able to
reﬂect and reason with knowledge from environmental regime
theory.
Fig. 4 provides an overview of the different steps in the process
of applying the model and is explained in more detail in Section
2.5.3, 2.5.4 and the next two sections.
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Fig. 5. Scores of four regimes on likelihood of regime formation (based on weighted average of expert responses). Left panel: overall and partial scores on three categories of
context variables. Right panel: contribution of design variables (overall scores are compared to a situation without policy measures).
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Input data for the analysis of the four regimes were obtained by
means of expert-elicitation. Per regime scientists with experience
in the ﬁeld of international environmental policy scored the values
of all input variables and e as a kind of self-assessment e the
corresponding levels of conﬁdence that they had in these scores.
Variables were directly scored on a scale from 0 (extremely low) to
10 (extremely high) for numerical variables, or 0 (no)/10 (yes) for
binary variables (Tables 1a and 1b). All experts’ scores are available
as Supplementary information. Seven experts scored the variable
values for the Climate and Forest regime; for the Ozone and
Biodiversity regime respectively six and two experts completed the
scoring form. As the forest regime was never established in the
form of a signed treaty, only variables on regime formation were
included in its analysis.
Per regime scores of all experts were converted to a single set of
input values for the model by calculating the weighted averages of
the expert scores, where the weighting factors were based on the
corresponding conﬁdence levels speciﬁed by the experts. The
values of the input variables showed much diversity in expert
opinions. As averaging expert values may hide this diversity and
give an incomplete picture of the input information, we also per-
formed model calculations with the separate sets of expert
responses (Supplementary information). Results show no system-
atic under or overscoring by the experts, so we considered expert
scores both on the level of overall likelihood and in the different
categories comparable.
Finally we included also an artiﬁcial, i.e. not based on expert
values, situation called ‘no policy’ to assess the effect of policy
measures taken in the formation and implementation phase of the
regimes. Input values for the ‘no policy’ situation were derived by
for all design variables choosing values that would have most
negative impact on likelihood of regime formation or imple-
mentation, while for all context variables their regular values (i.e.
the weighted averages) were used. Model input data are available
as Supplementary information.
3.2. Model calculation
We calculated model results following the different steps that
are explained in Fig. 4 and in Sections 2.5.3 And 2.5.4. During thisprocess we made some additional decisions regarding the meth-
odology. If none of the experts scored a certain input variable, the
corresponding rules in the fuzzy rule base were excluded from the
model analysis. In the analysis of regime formation the rules on
‘powerful pushers’, ‘powerful laggards’ and ‘positive issue linkages’
were excluded for the biodiversity regime, and rules on ‘differen-
tiated rules’ and ‘informal agreement’ were excluded for the forest
regime.
For pragmatic reasons we have decided to choose the same form
of membership functions for all input variables (Fig. 3) to offer the
experts a common ground for scoring all variables. A more differ-
entiated choice, which would allow for different choices in shapes
and positioning of the memberships for the various input variables,
would add a rather complicated and demanding task in the scoring
sessions for the experts. After performing some initial sensitivity
analyses (available as Supplementary information) to study the
effects of other feasible membership function choices, we ﬁnally
decided to stick to our pragmatic choice of uniformity.
3.3. Model results
3.3.1. Representation of model results
The ﬁnal overall output values of our model, i.e. likelihood of
regime formation and implementation (Figs. 5 and 6; left panel)
give an indication of the circumstances under which the four
regimes were formed and implemented. A value of 0 means that
circumstances are highly unfavourable and consequently the
formation or implementation process will be extremely difﬁcult
for the participating states, whereas a value of 10 indicates highly
favourable circumstances and a very easy formation or imple-
mentation process. In addition to these single overall output
values we have also calculated ‘partial results’ (also represented in
Figs. 5 and 6; left panel) by considering only the contribution of
the subset of rules which are linked to each of the three categories
of context variables separately (State Actors, Regime Environment,
Problem Structure), which give some additional insight in the
contribution of each separate category to the ﬁnal output. More
detailed information on the determinants of effectiveness of the
four regimes can be obtained from the fuzzy rule base by looking
at the Degree Of Fulﬁlment (DOF) tables, which are summarized in
Tables 2a and 2b. Full DOF tables are available as Supplementary
information.
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Fig. 6. Scores of four regimes on likelihood of regime implementation (based on weighted average of expert responses). Left panel: overall and partial scores on three categories of
context variables. Right panel: contribution of design variables (overall scores are compared to a situation without policy measures).
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formation and implementation is shown by comparing the scores
of the overall output values of the regimes to a situation without
policy measures, i.e. where all design variables have the most
unfavourable value (Figs. 5 and 6; right panel).
3.3.2. Description of model results
Overall scores show that formation was easiest for the ozone
regime and most difﬁcult for the forest regime (Fig. 5; left panel).
Implementation of the Climate regime went less smoothly than
implementation of the ozone and biodiversity regime (Fig. 6; left
panel). However, the overall scores of the regimes in the formation
and implementation phase do not differ much. The partial scores in
the three categories of context variables provide some insight in the
type of factors contributing to the effectiveness of the four regimes.
These partial scores are different for the formation and imple-
mentation phase, as the categories in both phases contain different
variables (Table 1a and b).
The problem characteristics of deforestation were least favour-
able for regime formation, while characteristics of ozone pollution
were most favourable for both regime formation and imple-
mentation (Figs. 5 and 6; left panel). Deforestation and biodiversity
loss are cumulative problems, i.e. they are local in nature, but are
globally replicated, which decrease the likelihood of regime
formation and implementation (Table 2a and b). Ozone pollution
and climate change, on the other hand, are systemic problems with
both global causes and effects, which encourages regime formation
and implementation. Furthermore, regulation costs of the ozone
and biodiversity regime were lower than those of the climate and
forest regime (Table 2a and b).
State actors involved in the ozone regime were more harmo-
nious (Figs. 5 and 6; left panel), represented by homogeneity and
limited asymmetry (Table 2a and b), compared to those involved in
the other regimes, which increased likelihood of regime formation
and implementation. In contrast with the other regimes, the forest
regime had only laggards and no pushers, i.e. that there were no
state actors trying to achieve cooperation and regime formation
and hence that regime was never turned into a signed treaty.
Conditions concerning state actors were less favourable for the
climate regime due to the higher number of economic actors
involved in regime formation and implementation (Table 2a and b).The regime environment in the formation phase was least
favourable for the climate regime (Fig. 5; left panel) as there was no
preceding agreement or policy dealing with this issue (Table 2a).
Institutional interactions had both positive and negative effect on
the implementation of the climate and biodiversity regime, but
merely positive inﬂuence on the implementation of the ozone
regime (Table 2b).
The inﬂuence of design variables, i.e. policy measures, in the
regime formation phase contributed little to the overall scores on
likelihood of regime formation (Fig. 5; right panel). Measures taken
in negotiation process of the ozone and climate regime, like side
payments and the formation of an initial framework treaty, had
most effect. Policy measures taken in the implementation phase
had a bigger impact on the overall score (Fig. 6; right panel).
Likelihood of implementation of all three regimes was increased by
measures like legally binding rules, a strong secretariat and
mechanisms for increasing public awareness.
3.4. Reﬂection on model results
Finally we compared the established model results with obser-
vations in reality on the formation and implementation process of
the four regimes. Model results indicate that several components of
the problem structure of deforestation are currently unfavourable
for regime formation, which reﬂects the current situation of
international negotiations on forest issues. Indeed, deforestation is
often considered a prime example of failed regime formation
(Dimitrov, 2003). At the same time, our analysis also suggests ways
to mitigate the barriers to regime formation: for example, high
interest asymmetry between state actors on the problem of
deforestation can at least partially be mitigated by rule differenti-
ation. With respect to the climate and ozone regimes, there is
a wide consensus that while the ozone regime has resulted in
a close-to-complete phase-out of ozone depleting substances (and
the corresponding recovery of the stratospheric ozone layer),
climate change is still unabated despite the existence of the Kyoto
Protocol. Using the scores from the expert judgement, our model
identiﬁed that several context variables are more favourable in the
case of ozone. This observation is in line with authoritative schol-
arly analysis, which identiﬁes ozone as the more successful
example of regime formation and implementation (Barrett, 1999).
Table 2
a: Summary of the degree of fulﬁlment tables of the four analysed regimes.
b: Summary of the degree of fulﬁlment tables of the three analysed regimes.
a.
Context variables for
regime formation
Likelihood of regime formation
Biodiversity Forest Ozone Climate
Problem structure
Regulation costs    
Public concern    
Systemic/cumulative problem   þ þ
Uncertainty    
Collaboration/coordination
problem
   
State actors
Asymmetry of interest of
powerful states
   
Asymmetry of interest of
important states in issue area
   
Support of powerful states   þ 
Number of economic sectors þ þ þ 
Homogeneous states   þþ 
Urgency þ þ þ þ
Cumulative cleavages    
Powerful pushers  þþ þþ
Powerful laggards   
Regime environment
Preceding agreement þþ þþ þþ 
Scientiﬁc advisory bodies þþ þþ þþ þþ
b.
Context variables for
regime implementation
Likelihood of regime formation
Biodiversity Ozone Climate
Problem structure
Regulation costs   
Collaboration/coordination problem   
Systemic/cumulative problem  þ þ
State actors
Participation government þ  þþ
Participation powerful states  þ 
Number economic sectors þ þ 
Outvoting of important states   
Asymmetry of interest of
powerful states
  
Asymmetry of interest of
important states in issue area
  
Regime environment
Institutional framework  
Negative interplay   
Positive interactions þþ þþ þþ
 very low;  low;  medium; þ high; þþ very high.
After evaluation the fuzzy rules are combined to express the linguistic value of the
output variable ‘likelihood of regime formation’ per context variable (see
Supplementary information).
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and covered a limited range in the output space, which is a logical
consequence of our decision to extend the fuzzy rule base with
rules which conclude on neutral likelihood in situations where we
lack information (Section 2.5.2). Nevertheless, the model enabled
a meaningful comparison between the four regimes and the factors
inﬂuencing their effectiveness. The set of artiﬁcially added rules
represent the knowledge that is missing in the literature on envi-
ronmental regime theory in order to perform a systematic analysis
of regime effectiveness. Additional research on these topics is
needed to improve the fuzzy rule base and consequently the
discriminative power of the model.
The results of the model analysis imply that the category ‘state
actors’ has a greater impact on regime effectiveness than ‘regime
environment’, since more variables and rules are involved in this
‘state actors’ category (see Table 1a,b). This difference in impactmay be a true representation of reality, but may also be caused by
a bias in literature for example because factors concerning state
actors are easier to study than factors concerning regime environ-
ment. Additional study is needed to assess whether the set of rules
for input variables should be adapted or a weighting system of the
categories should be implemented in the model.
Design variables contributed little to the overall scores on like-
lihood of regime formation, but had more impact in the imple-
mentation phase. As such the model reﬂects our decision to
consider them as mitigating factors in the formation process and as
independently acting variables in the implementation process
(Section 2.5.2). The model thus implies that policy measures taken
in the implementation phase have bigger inﬂuence on regime
effectiveness than measures taken in the formation phase. This ﬁts
with our understanding of reality.
A serious limitation of our approach is the subjectivity in the
scoring of input variables and in the deﬁnition of membership
functions, which were based on expert knowledge instead of direct
empirical evidence/data. Some authors have populated their fuzzy
models with quantiﬁable indicators that were selected for their
data availability (Acosta-Michlik et al., 2008; Phillis and
Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001). As a consequence they left out
data-limited variables that may have been important in explaining
their understanding of the modelled system (Carr and Kettle,
2009). Most of the variables in our conceptual framework are
data-limited, but nonetheless important to include in the fuzzy
model as they capture the expert knowledge on the effectiveness of
environmental regimes. However, the rather indicative and prag-
matic approach that we have currently taken in this study could in
the future be improved by invoking better methods for expert-
elicitation (Cornelissen et al., 2003).
4. General discussion and conclusions
Model results of the four analysed regimes were in line with
observations from reality. This indicates that the model is able to
reﬂect and reason with knowledge from environmental regime
theory and that robust general knowledge rules on the effective-
ness of environmental regimes can be used to analyse individual
regimes. The model can be used as an aid in analysing the effec-
tiveness of existing or future regimes, highlighting which deter-
minants contribute to success or failure, and it enables systematic
and meaningful comparisons between regimes and policy
measures. Besides, the model can be used for experimenting with
the factors that affect regime effectiveness, which may offer useful
insights in environmental regime theory and encourage discussions
between natural and political scientists.
Formalizingknowledgeonenvironmental regimes ina conceptual
framework and a model enhanced its transparency and deductive
poweras it forced us to be explicit about our choices and assumptions
regarding determining factors and their potential effects on regime
effectiveness (Krugman,1997; Powell, 2002). As such, the conceptual
framework andmodel are expected to offer researchers in integrated
assessmentuseful insights inenvironmental regime theory.However,
since formalizing entails the danger of discarding important aspects
of an over-complex reality (Biermann, 2007), results of analyses
performed with the conceptual framework and model should
whenever possible be compared with empirical analysis, and be
interpretedwithdue regard to the limitationsand simplifying choices
and assumptions involved in the study.
Developing and using the framework and model also revealed
the lacunae in knowledge in environmental regime theory. In
order to make a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of envi-
ronmental regimes there is more information needed on the
situations that are currently covered by artiﬁcially added rules in
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of input variables, the temporal dynamics of the input variables
and their mutual relationships and inﬂuences. The set of fuzzy
rules represents the knowledge base in our model and its form
makes it easy to understand, discuss and add to the knowledge
that is captured in the model. We consider this rule set as an
ongoing body of work. The lacunae in knowledge identiﬁed in this
paper may inform regime researchers to further structure and
increase their knowledge on the functioning of environmental
institutions (Biermann et al., 2010) and encourage them to
contribute to the fuzzy rule base.
By making knowledge on environmental regimes explicit and
understandable we have taken an important step towards a better
integration of social science in integrated assessment. We think
that, in integrated assessments, it is necessary to consider both the
potential impacts of environmental regimes and their chance of
successful formation and implementation. This is in line with
studies in sustainability science stating that in order to ﬁnd effec-
tive ways of dealing with global environmental problems inte-
grated assessments should be strengthened in their policy
relevance (Reid et al., 2010) and should pay as much attention to
social science as to natural science (Kates et al., 2001; Ostrom,
2009). Recent integrated approaches (van Delden et al., 2011;
Nabel et al., 2011; Schaldach et al., 2011) which combine informa-
tion from various sources (data, models, experience) and domains
(economic, environmental, social) and connect explicitly to policy
context, interest groups and end-users, provide useful and prom-
ising means to assess the implications of proposed policy options in
a broader context. Typically they assume that considered policy
options will be(come) active, and they do not explicitly address the
question what the feasibility of realizing these policy options is. In
our approach e by focusing on conditions and factors that deter-
mine a successful formation and implementation of environmental
regimes e we expect to contribute to this often neglected impor-
tant issue.
We believe, however, that that at this stage it is not yet possible
and may be even undesirable, to actually include knowledge on
environmental regimes directly into the computer models used in
integrated assessments. Attempts to do so (Anderies, 2000; Smajgl
et al., 2009) focus on the impact of institutions on human behaviour
and the resulting impact on the environment, but do not consider
explicitly their formation and implementation. Our model and
framework, on the other hand, especially focus on the political
feasibility of environmental regimes but their scope and variables
differ presently toomuch from those used in integrated assessment
models to bridge the gap in a direct way and enable successful and
meaningful integration. The current contribution of our model lies
primarily in enhancing the interpretation of results from integrated
assessment models by examining the political context more
explicitly. Furthermore, results from analyses with our model can
be used to improve scenario storylines for use in integrated
assessment modelling, which could account for the development
and existence of promising future environmental regimes and
provide the factors that need to be in place for their effectiveness.
Currently most scenarios used in assessments lack policy relevance
as they are devised by scientists and do not consider speciﬁc policy
options (Perrings et al., 2011). Summarizing, we believe that the
integration of the knowledge on environmental regimes in inte-
grated assessments is still in its early days and requires further
attention in the future.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2012.08.004.Appendix B. Rules on the likelihood of regime formation and
implementation as applied in the conceptual framework
I. Regime formation
A Problem structure
A1 The higher the regulation costs, the less likely is regime
formation.
A2 High public concern for the problem increases likelihood of
regime formation.
A3 Systemic problems increase the likelihood of regime formation.
A4 Cumulative problems decrease the likelihood of regime
formation.
A5 Scientiﬁc uncertainty decreases the likelihood of regime
formation.
A6 In case of a collaboration problem, regime formation is less
likely.
B Negotiation process
B1 The higher the negotiation costs, the less likely is regime
formation.
B2 If a problem is marked with great asymmetry of powerful states
interests, differentiation of rules increases likelihood of regime
formation.
B3 If a problem is marked with great asymmetry of interest
between important states within the issue area, differentiation
of rules increases likelihood of regime formation.
B4 In case of a collaboration problem, the more side-payments are
made available, the more likely is regime formation.
B5 In case of high transaction costs and scientiﬁc uncertainty, an
initial framework treaty followed by more precise agreements
increases likelihood of regime formation.
B6 If the environmental problem is considered urgent by
a majority of actors, an initial informal agreement increases
likelihood of regime formation.
B7 In case of cumulative cleavages, regime formation is more likely
if there are positive or negative incentives.
B8 In case of a collaboration problem, regime formation is more
likely if there are positive issue-linkages.
B9 In case of cumulative cleavages, regime formation is less likely.
C Actors
C1 In case of a systemic environmental problem, non-support of
one or more important states within the issue area, decreases
likelihood of regime formation.
C2 In case of a cumulative environmental problem, the more of the
important states within the issue area support a regime, the
more likely is regime formation.
C3 Great asymmetry of powerful states interests decreases likeli-
hood of regime formation.
C4 Great asymmetry of interest between important states within
the issue area decreases likelihood of regime formation.
C5 If almost all powerful states support regime formation, then
regime formation is more likely.
C6 If almost all important states within the issue area support
regime formation, then regime formation is more likely.
C7 The fewer economic sectors are needed to regulate an envi-
ronmentally harmful activity, the more likely is regime
formation.
C8 If the states needed to regulate a harmful activity are homo-
geneous, then regime formation is more likely.
C9 If the environmental problem is considered urgent by the
majority of states, then regime formation is more likely.
C10 If the coalition of “pushers” is more powerful than the rest,
regime formation is more likely.
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than the rest, regime formation is less likely.
D Regime Environment
D1 The existence of a preceding international agreement dealing
with the same or a similar problem enhances the likelihood of
regime formation.
D2 Consensual scientiﬁc information by scientiﬁc advisory bodies
increases the likelihood of regime formation.
D3 Participation by stakeholders in decision-making increases the
likelihood of regime formation.
II. Regime implementation
E Problem structure
E1 In case of a collaboration problem, regime implementation is
less likely.
E2 The higher the regulation costs, the less likely is regime
implementation.
E3 Systemic problems increase the likelihood of regime
implementation.
E4 Cumulative problems decrease the likelihood of regime
implementation.
F Actors
F1 Participation of high-level government representation in COPs
increases likelihood of regime implementation.
F2 If almost all powerful states participate in a regime, then regime
implementation is more likely.
F3 If almost all important states within the issue area participate in
a regime, then regime implementation is more likely.
F4 The fewer economic sectors are needed to regulate an envi-
ronmentally harmful activity, the more likely is regime
implementation.
F5 In case of a systemic environmental problem, non-participation
of one or more important states within the issue area, decreases
regime implementation.
F6 In case of a cumulative environmental problem, the more of the
important states within the issue area participate in the regime,
the more likely is regime implementation.
F7 Outvoting of important states within the issue area decreases
regime implementation.
F8 Great asymmetry of interest between powerful states decreases
likelihood of regime implementation.
F9 Great asymmetry of interest between important states within
the issue area decreases likelihood of regime implementation.
G Regime design
G1 Regime mechanisms that increase scientiﬁc knowledge gener-
ation, synthesis and dissemination are likely to increase regime
implementation.
G2 If a problem is markedwith great asymmetry of powerful states
interests, differentiation of rules increases likelihood of regime
implementation.
G3 If a problem is marked with great asymmetry of interest
between important states within the issue area, differentiation
of rules increases likelihood of regime implementation.
G4 In case of a collaboration problem, regime implementation is
more likely if there is a strong compliance mechanism.
G5 Regime implementation is more likely if there are side-
payments.
G6 In case of a coordination problem, regime implementation is
less likely without a strong information and communication
mechanism.G7 The more precise the rules of a regime are, the more likely is
regime implementation.
G8 Legally binding rules increase the likelihood of regime
implementation.
G9 Differentiated rules increase the likelihood of regime
implementation.
G10 The existence of a strong autonomous secretariat increases the
likelihood of regime implementation.
G11 Mechanisms for regular reporting and implementation review
increase the likelihood of regime implementation.
G12 Voting systems based on consensus or unanimity lead to
weaker decisions in regime implementation, which decreases
regime implementation.
G13 Regimes with broad issue coverage are more likely to be
implemented.
G14 Regime mechanisms that increase public awareness are likely
to increase regime implementation.
G15 In case of a collaboration problem, regime implementation is
more likely if there are positive side-payments.
G16 Sanction mechanisms within a regime increase likelihood of
regime implementation.
G17 An autonomous standing decision-body increases the likeli-
hood of regime implementation.
G18 An ad-hoc decision-body or a regular meeting of the Confer-
ence of the Parties decreases the likelihood of regime
implementation.
H Regime environment
H1 The embedding of a regime in a larger institutional framework
increases the likelihood of regime implementation.
H2 Negative interplay with other regimes decreases regime
implementation.
H3 Positive interactions with other regimes increase regime
implementation.
H4 Participation by stakeholders in decision-making increases the
likelihood of regime implementation.References
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